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JUMPING THE GUN: HEDGE FUNDS IN 
SEARCH OF CAPITAL UNDER UCITS IV 
INTRODUCTION 
An undertaking for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS)1 is a regulated investment scheme that complies with the UCITS 
Directive (UCITS I), as first enacted by the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1985,2 and its subsequent amendments (the UCITS 
Directives).3 In its current form, a UCITS fund4 has been described as a 
mutual fund that may employ certain hedge fund strategies.5 UCITS funds 
have been called everything from a “poor man’s hedge fund”6 or “hedge 
fund lite,”7 to a “badge of quality”8 or even the “gold standard”9 of investor 
protection. A UCITS fund offers “the best of both worlds,”10 in providing 
hedge fund-like investments and significant regulatory oversight, which has 
made them the “primary investment method for retail investors throughout 
[Europe].”11 This investment flexibility, accompanied by significant 
investor protection, is largely what the drafters of UCITS I envisioned when 
they sought to facilitate the cross-border offering of investment funds to 
retail investors, develop an integrated and competitive single European 
market for investment funds, and establish a uniform level of investor 
protection.12  
                                                                                                                           
 1. Pronounced yoo-sits. Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UCITS (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). 
 2. See Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L 375) (EEC) [hereinafter Council Directive 
85/611]; Albert Francke, III, Capital Flows between Countries: Reciprocal Arrangements for the 
Sale of Shares in Mutual Funds, 1987 COLUM. B. L. REV. 365, 366. 
 3. The UCITS Directives are “not law applicable to funds, but are part of the treaty apparatus 
that constitutes the [European Union (EU)]” whereby Member States are required to implement 
these directives at the “national level” within certain parameters. John C. Coates IV, Reforming 
the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. 
LEGAL ANAL. 591, 647 n.103 (2009). 
 4. Although the term “UCITS fund” renders the word “fund” redundant, as the word 
“undertaking” implies a certain investment vehicle, the concept is easier to grasp with this 
redundancy intact. 
 5. Dustin Hawks, Note, Long-Term Capital Gain: The Regulatory Landscape for Hedge 
Funds after Goldstein, 27 J.L. & COM. 171, 190 (2008). 
 6. Harriet Agnew, UCITS Interest Grows, ABSOLUTE RETURN + ALPHA, Dec. 15, 2008, 
http://www.absolutereturn-alpha.com/Article/2068537/Search/Ucits-Interest-Grows.html?Key 
words=UCITS+Interest+Grows. 
 7. Peter Guest, A Long/Short Answer to Risk Gains Popularity, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 
2008, at 16. 
 8. Agnew, supra note 6. 
 9. Grellan O’Kelley, UCITS Funds Gain Popularity, Increasingly Employ Hedge Fund 
Strategies, FINALTERNATIVES (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/8961. 
 10. George Sami, Comment, A Comparative Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in the United 
States and Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 275, 301 (2009). 
 11. See Michael J. Schmidt, Note, “Investor Protection” in Europe and the United States: 
Impacting the Future of Hedge Funds, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 161, 178 (2007). 
 12. See Francke, supra note 2, at 366. 
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UCITS funds follow the “common minimum standards”13 of the UCITS 
Directives and may be “freely marketed on a cross-border basis . . . in 
accordance with [a] single passport principle.”14 Legislative enactments 
have subsequently amended UCITS I15 through the “Management 
Directive”16 and the “Product Directive,”17 which were passed in 2001,18 
and together formed UCITS III.19 While UCITS funds utilize a limited set 
of eligible assets and strategies like mutual funds,20 subsequent amendments 
have permitted UCITS fund managers to employ sophisticated hedge fund 
strategies, traditionally outside the purview of mutual funds.21 The most 
recent amendment is UCITS IV,22 which was proposed in July 2008 and 
will come into effect in mid-2011.23 
                                                                                                                           
 13. Id. (explaining how Member States may exceed certain threshold requirements set at the 
EU level, but may not drop below the threshold). Such minimum “harmonization” requirements 
relate to “organization, management, oversight, fund diversification, liquidity, use of leverage, and 
eligible assets.” Elizabeth Grace et al., Financial Products and Services Committee, 42 INT’L 
LAW. 565, 572 (2008). 
 14. Jarkko Syyrila, Regulators’ Dilemma: Hedge Funds for the Public?, 18 J. INT’L BANKING 
L. & REG. 95, 97 (2003). 
 15. Paulina Dejmek, The EU Internal Market for Financial Services—A Look at the First 
Regulatory Reponses to the Financial Crisis and a View to the Future, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 455, 
472 (2009). 
 16. David Rouch & Katherine Smith, The UCITS Directive and the Single European Funds 
Market: A Case Review, 20 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 251, 252 (2005); Council Directive 
2001/107, 2002 O.J. (L 41) 20 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 2001/107]. The Management 
Directive regulates management companies and the simplified prospectus. Council Directive 
2001/107, supra. 
 17. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252; Council Directive 2001/108, 2002 O.J. (L 41) 35 
(EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 2001/108]. The Product Directive regulates investments by 
UCITS funds. Council Directive 2001/108, supra. 
 18. David A. Kanarek, Directive 2001/107/EC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (UCITS) with a View to Regulating Management Companies and Simplified 
Prospectuses, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 557, 557–58 (2002). 
 19. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252. UCITS II was a reform measure that was never 
implemented. See Ashley Kovas, UCITS—Past, Present and Future in a World of Increasing 
Product Diversity 11 n.35 (Inst. for Law and Fin., Working Paper No. 44, 2006), available at 
http://ilf-frankfurt.org/uploads/media/ILF_WP_044.pdf. 
 20. Mutual funds “may be more or less restrictive on any given issue” when compared to 
UCITS. Patrick J. Paul, Note, The European Community’s UCITS Directive: One Model for 
United States Regulatory Change in a Globalized Securities Market, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
61, 86 (1992) (quoting Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment 
Companies, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,322, 25,326 (June 21, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) 
(internal quotes omitted)). 
 21. See Hawks, supra note 5, at 190. 
 22. Council Directive 2009/65, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 32 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 
2009/65]. 
 23. Karen L. Anderberg & Jessica Brescia, UCITS and Cross-Border Registration: The 
Scheme Has Expanded Beyond Europe, THE HEDGE FUND J., July 2009, available at 
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/magazine/200907/technical/ucits-and-cross-border-
registration.php. 
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UCITS funds have become “[an EU] success story and global brand,”24 
accounting for 75% of assets under management within Europe’s fund 
industry and over €6 trillion in assets as of the second quarter of 2009.25 
Juxtaposed to this success, total global hedge fund assets fell by almost a 
third during the second half of 2008,26 due to both investor redemptions and 
losses.27 Consequently, hedge fund managers have been in search of a 
means to replenish these assets. 28 Many of these managers see a UCITS 
“wrapper”29 as a solution.30 
The UCITS structure presents an opportunity for hedge funds to solicit 
both retail and institutional investors on a cross-border basis, thus 
broadening their investor bases and the availability of assets.31 Investors are 
likewise seeking out UCITS funds32 because of their reputation for greater 
transparency and liquidity than traditional hedge funds,33 which saw 
massive redemptions after Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme was 
brought to light at the end of 2008.34 Additionally, the European 
Commission’s (EC’s) initial draft of the Directive on Alternative 
                                                                                                                           
 24. Dejmek, supra note 15, at 472. 
 25. EUROPEAN FUND AND ASSET MGMT. ASS’N, TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT 
FUND INDUSTRY IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 2009, at 8 (2009), http://www.efama.org/ 
index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=1033. 
 26. Richard Ernesti & William Potts, Hedge Funds Turn to the UCITS Kitemark, 
HEDGEWEEK (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.hedgeweek.com/2009/09/09/hedge-funds-turn-ucits-
kitemark. 
 27. Saijel Kishan, Hedge-Fund Investors Remove Record $152 Billion, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 21, 
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aL3fOSkanqs8; 
Tomoko Yamazaki, Hedge Funds Post Record $350 Billion Loss in 2008, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 14, 
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ahzEW2I3AhP8#. 
 28. See Ernesti & Potts, supra note 26. 
 29. Bryan Goh, UCITS III: The Opportunity, HEDGED.BIZ (Nov. 9, 2009, 4:35 PM), 
http://hedged.biz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=202:ucits-iii-the-
opportunity&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=63 (explaining how certain hedge funds may be able to 
offer the same product in a different “wrapper” by being UCITS compliant).  
 30. See Ernesti & Potts, supra note 26. 
 31. See id. One of the first hedge fund managers to launch a UCITS III fund was RWC 
Partners in 2006. Steve Johnson, UCITS Pioneer in the Hedge Fund World Warns of Glut, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 23, 2010, at 4. 
 32. During August 2009, “[i]nflows into UCITS funds amounted to €36 billion.” Joel 
Schoppig, UCITS Funds See €36 bn Inflows in a Month, CITYWIRE (Oct. 14, 2009, 1:01 PM), 
http://www.citywire.co.uk/selector/-/news/other/content.aspx?ID=361760. 
 33. See Syyrila, supra note 14, at 97–98. During periods of exceptional market stress, liquidity 
may not be a guarantee just by virtue of initially being UCITS compliant. See ADVENT, UCITS 
COME TO THE FORE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUNDS INDUSTRY 6 (2010), 
available at http://www.advent.com/collateral/wp_ucits.pdf. 
 34. See Phil Wahba, Hedge Fund Industry Still Feeling Madoff Effect, REUTERS, Mar. 26, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/PrivateEquityandHedgeFunds09/idUSN2544322520090326 
?pageNumber=1 (explaining the negative effect of the Madoff scandal on the hedge fund 
industry). But see Stephanie Bodoni, Luxembourg Seeks Closure of Third Madoff-Linked Fund 
(Update 2), BLOOMBERG, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory 
&refer=conews&tkr=UBS%3AUS&sid=a6tXFEXnxUww (explaining how Madoff-linked UCITS 
funds—not hedge funds—had to be liquidated by Luxembourg’s financial regulator). 
476 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
Investment Fund Managers (AIFM Directive)35 may have motivated hedge 
fund managers in the EU and the U.S. to seek compliance under UCITS,36 
rather than face potentially onerous restrictions.37 That said, it is expected 
that 1,000 hedge funds with over $150 billion in assets under 
management—including many leading names in the industry38—will have 
made the transition to UCITS III-compliance by the end of 2010.39 Some 
are even predicting that the current hedge fund industry will “mostly 
disappear” with the launch of these “newcits.”40 
Despite the recent flood of hedge funds transitioning to the UCITS 
brand,41 this conversion may be premature given the realities of UCITS IV, 
in its current form.42 Significant up-front and on-going costs will continue 
to be associated with running a UCITS IV-compliant fund, despite the 
professed benefits.43 Further, the specter of registration under the AIFM 
Directive in the EU and hedge fund registration under Dodd-Frank in the 
                                                                                                                           
 35. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2004/39/EC and 2009/ . . . /EC, COM 
(2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Initial AIFM Directive Proposal]. The initial draft of 
the AIFM Directive imposed heightened restrictions on alternative funds that are not UCITS 
funds, which included hedge funds and private equity funds, while offering some of these funds a 
marketing passport throughout Europe. See Simon Thomas & Samuel T. Brooks, European 
Alternative Funds: The Alternatives, THE HEDGE FUND LAW REP., June 24, 2009, 
http://www.hflawreport.com/issue/72 (follow “European Alternative Funds: The Alternatives” 
hyperlink). 
 36. See Sam Jones, Funds in Effort to Trump Rules with UCITS Roll-Out, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Sept. 11, 2009, at 13; Thomas & Brooks, supra note 35; How Asian Funds Will Avoid 
EU Directive, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1, 2009, available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/ 
2282895/How-Asian-funds-will-avoid-EU-directive.html. 
 37. Some of the restrictions relate to: marketing, capitalization, operations, disclosure and 
reporting, investment, valuation protocols, and custody of fund assets. Press Release, Europa, 
Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMs): Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 
29, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/211&format= 
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter Europa Press Release]. 
 38. A non-exhaustive list of hedge fund managers forming UCITS funds includes RAB 
Capital, Man Group, Thames River, Marshall Wace, Blackrock, Schroders, Pimco, 3A, Collins 
Stewart Fund Management, and HSBC. Steve Johnson, Fund of Funds Dive into Hedgie UCITS 
Pool, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 16, 2009, at 3. 
 39. EUREKAHEDGE, THE EUREKAHEDGE REPORT: SEPTEMBER 2010, at 34 (2010), 
http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/EHReport_tracker.asp?File=21092010_EH_Report.pdf. 
 40. Angus Foote, Corsaletti Sees ‘Newcits’ Bringing Radical Change to Hedge Fund Sector, 
CITYWIRE (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.citywire.co.uk/selector/-/news/selectors-choice/ 
content.aspx?ID=371477. But see Divya Guha, Analysis Must Change to Deal with ‘Newcits’ 
Funds, Say Selectors, CITYWIRE (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.citywire.co.uk/selector/-
/news/comment/content.aspx?ID=368669 (explaining that 85% of selectors do not believe 
“newcits” funds will replace both traditional long-only and hedge funds). 
 41. See Michael S. Fischer, The UCITS States of America, HFMWEEK (Oct. 15, 2009), 
http://www.hfmweek.com/articles/homepage/comment-and-analysis/262132/the-ucits-states-of-
america.thtml. 
 42. See Marco Lamandini, The Commission’s UCITS IV Proposal: Is It Sufficient to Create a 
True Single Market Platform? 1–2 (unpublished manuscript) (Sept. 4, 2008), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=marco_lamandini. 
 43. See Fischer, supra note 41; Lamandini, supra note 42, at 15. 
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U.S. may partially explain why hedge funds have nevertheless sought out 
UCITS-compliance.44 While the benefits of UCITS IV are potentially 
tangible—as evidenced by this recent interest—UCITS IV must be 
amended in order to realistically achieve a fully integrated and efficient 
investment fund market in Europe. Part I of this note will examine the 
UCITS I and UCITS III regimes45 through the Management and Product 
Directives, as they provide the foundation for UCITS IV. Part II will 
explore the amendments comprising UCITS IV. Part III will examine the 
costs and benefits associated with UCITS-compliance and the influence of 
EU and U.S. hedge fund registration proposals on fund managers seeking 
UCITS-compliance. Part IV will suggest possible amendments to UCITS 
IV so that its benefits are more firmly within reach. 
I. QUITE AN UNDERTAKING: UCITS I THROUGH UCITS III 
A. UCITS I 
UCITS I must first be discussed to provide the necessary groundwork 
for understanding UCITS III.46 UCITS I took effect on October 1, 198947 by 
establishing “common minimum standards for the authorization and 
operation of UCITS” so as to meet the twin goals of ensuring regulatory 
harmonization and maintaining adequate investor protection.48 It is 
important to emphasize that UCITS I set forth minimum standards, over 
which Member States could impose stricter requirements.49 These minimum 
standards related to the structure of UCITS funds, the eligible assets in 
which UCITS funds could invest, and the extent to which authorization in a 
Home Member State could be “passported”50 to a Host Member State.51 
However, part of the failure of UCITS I was that individual Member States 
did, in fact, impose stricter requirements, which led to “drastically varied” 
regulation across Member States, frustrating harmonization.52 
                                                                                                                           
 44. Simon Gray, Milestones on the Road to Recovery, HEDGEWEEK (Mar. 17, 2009), 
http://www.hedgeweek.com/2011/03/17/110206/milestones-road-recovery. 
 45. As previously mentioned, UCITS II was never implemented and, therefore, will not be 
discussed. See Kovas, supra note 19, at 11 n.35. 
 46. While UCITS I has been subsequently amended by further directives, provisions of UCITS 
I that have not been directly revised remain in force. 
 47. Allan S. Mostoff, Organizing and Marketing Undertaking for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS), 824 PLI/CORP 131, 133–34 (1993). 
 48. Francke, supra note 2, at 366. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23. 
 51. A UCITS fund is subject to the supervision of the EU Member State in which it is 
domiciled—its Home Member State; authorization from that Home Member State is supposed to 
be sufficient to obtain authorization in a different Member State, i.e. passporting authorization. 
See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 4. 
 52. See David T. Schubauer, Note, The Inadequacy of the UCITS Directive in a Global 
Marketplace, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323, 324 (2002). Ironically, it was initially 
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Although a UCITS fund may pursue a wide range of strategies in 
various legal forms,53 all UCITS funds must comply with certain 
restrictions.54 Under UCITS I, funds had to be open-ended structures whose 
sole object was to invest in transferable securities or other liquid assets.55 
Additionally, a UCITS fund had to—and still must—“repurchase or redeem 
its units at the request of any unit-holder”56 and publish the price at which 
they were redeemed at least twice a month.57 As a result, funds could invest 
no more than 10% of their assets in certain illiquid transferable or debt 
securities,58 no more than 5% in other UCITS funds, and no assets in non-
UCITS.59 Such limits prevented UCITS funds from creating portfolios that 
were disproportionately composed of illiquid securities, which would make 
on-demand investor redemption difficult.60 UCITS I also imposed 
diversification limits,61 as well as borrowing and lending limits.62 However, 
these restrictions prevented UCITS fund managers from operating with 
sufficient flexibility to seize certain investment opportunities.63 
Despite the aforementioned restrictions, the passporting of 
authorization is the carrot that justifies the stick. In theory, when a Home 
Member State authorizes a UCITS fund to operate in that particular 
country, the authorization is valid for all other Member States through a 
notification procedure, which allows that UCITS fund to market its shares 
to the public in a Host Member State64 after just two months.65 However, 
under UCITS I, a Host Member State’s regulator could deny authorization 
for cause (subject to judicial review).66 Additionally, as UCITS I did not 
cover distribution activities concerning advertisement, listing, and sales 
                                                                                                                           
speculated as unlikely that member countries would “ever go beyond the minimum standards of 
the directive” due to concerns of competitive advantage. Francke, supra note 2, at 366. 
 53. UCITS funds may be structured in various legal forms, including common funds managed 
by management companies, as unit trusts, or as investment companies. Council Directive 85/611, 
supra note 2, art. 1(3). 
 54. See Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2. 
 55. Id. art. 19. 
 56. Id. art. 37(1). 
 57. Id. art. 34. Although Member States may reduce the frequency of redemptions to once a 
month in certain cases. Id. 
 58. Id. art. 19(2)–(3). 
 59. Id. art. 24(1)–(2). 
 60. See Goh, supra note 29. 
 61. A fund could not invest more than 5% of its assets in a single security. Council Directive 
85/611, supra note 2, art. 22(1). This requirement allowed UCITS funds to operate within the 
principle of risk spreading. See id. art. 1(3); Schubauer, supra note 52, at 328–29 (explaining that 
the 5% limit encourages diversification to limit a fund’s exposure to risk). 
 62. Funds could not borrow more than 15% of their assets on a temporary basis, and 
conversely, could not grant loans or act as guarantor on behalf of third parties. Council Directive 
85/611, supra note 2, arts. 36(2), 41(1). 
 63. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252 (discussing how UCITS III “extended” the 
investment powers and versatility of UCITS funds). 
 64. See Schubauer, supra note 52, at 327–28. 
 65. Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 46. 
 66. See id. art. 51. 
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practices,67 individual Member States disjointedly regulated these 
activities.68 It is this type of supplemental regulation that prevented full 
integration under UCITS I and left only a “small number of funds”69 
capable of taking the “cross-border plunge.”70 
Tied to the authorization process, UCITS I required comprehensive 
disclosure requirements aimed at ensuring investor protection.71 These 
disclosure requirements took the form of a prospectus and both annual and 
semi-annual reports.72 Under UCITS I, the prospectus specifically required 
a minimum set of information “necessary for investors to be able to make 
an informed judgement of the investment proposed to them,”73 which had to 
be kept up to date.74 In addition to the annual and semi-annual reports, the 
prospectus had to be forwarded to a Host Member State for authorization 
purposes with an “attestation” of authorization from the Home Member 
State and the fund’s organizing documents.75 Although UCITS I laid the 
necessary framework for a unified collective investment market and a 
uniform level of investor protection, the goal of full integration was slow to 
be realized.76 
B. UCITS III: MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE 
In order to further promote the cross-border sale of UCITS funds and 
modernize UCITS funds’ investment choices, the EC passed the 
Management Directive and the Product Directive in 2001.77 The 
Management Directive sought to remedy the balkanization of the UCITS 
fund industry by: (1) expanding management company activities; (2) 
equalizing competition; and (3) requiring the publication of a “simplified 
prospectus in addition to the full prospectus.”78 The simplified prospectus 
                                                                                                                           
 67. See William C. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating Investment Funds in the Formerly 
Centrally Planned Economies, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 539, 574 n.157 (1994); Council Directive 
85/611, supra note 2, art. 44. Similarly, subsequent directives do not regulate distribution 
activities. See Council Directive 2001/107, supra note 16; Council Directive 2007/16, 2007 O.J. 
(L 79/11) (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 2007/16]; Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 
22. 
 68. See Philbrick, supra note 67, at 574. 
 69. See Schubauer, supra note 52, at 329. 
 70. Liam Mulloy, Letter to the Editor, Old Taxation Habits Die Hard, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Jan. 11, 1991, at 17. 
 71. See O’Kelley, supra note 9. 
 72. Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 27. 
 73. Id. art. 28(1). 
 74. Id. art. 30. 
 75. Id. art. 46. 
 76. Lamandini, supra note 42, at 5. 
 77. See Robert W. Helm & Kevin K. Babikian, Creating, Managing and Distributing Offshore 
Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, in NUTS AND BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 2006: 
UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPITAL MARKET & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 
PRODUCTS 675, 858–60 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook Ser. No. 8392) (2006). 
 78. Kanarek, supra note 18, at 558. 
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was a major change that aimed to provide the average investor with clear, 
concise information79 necessary to make an informed investment decision, 
in contrast with the long, confusing prospectus utilized under UCITS I.80 
While the simplified prospectus had to be published alongside the full 
prospectus81 in the official language of the Host Member State or in a 
language approved by the Host Member State,82 fund managers only had to 
provide the full prospectus, annual report, and semi-annual report upon 
request.83 However, despite the simplified prospectus being a “maximum 
harmonisation”84 document, it eventually became apparent that the 
simplified prospectus was not simplified enough.85 
While the Management Directive arguably made the prospectus more 
investor-friendly, it failed to address the sluggish passporting process, 
which acted as a barrier to entry for UCITS funds.86 The continued 
inefficiency of the passporting process can be partially attributed to the 
wide variation of extraneous information required by different Member 
States, beyond that specified under UCITS I.87 As a result, the cross-border 
registration of UCITS funds remained a costly and time-consuming process, 
both in obtaining initial authorization and operating on an ongoing basis.88 
With uncertainty as to when a fund would be able to begin operating, many 
funds failed to venture out of their Home Member States,89 partly 
contributing to a high concentration of UCITS funds in Luxembourg, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom.90 
                                                                                                                           
 79. The contents of the simplified prospectus included: “a brief presentation of the UCITS,” 
“investment information,” economic information regarding taxation, fees and expenses, and 
commercial information detailing the manner in which its units can be bought and sold. Council 
Directive 2001/107, supra note 16, at Annex 1: Schedule C; Helm & Babikian, supra note 77, at 
864. 
 80. Schubauer, supra note 52, at 332. 
 81. Council Directive 2001/107, supra note 16, art. 27(1). 
 82. Id. art. 47. 
 83. Id. art. 33(1). 
 84. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 258 (explaining how individual Member States 
could not impose stricter regulations than those at the EU level). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id.; see also Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 44. 
 88. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 257 (explaining that the two-month approval period 
was a soft-deadline in practice). 
 89. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 6. 
 90. See id. But see Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 259 (explaining how the high 
concentration of UCITS funds in certain countries can also be attributed to the fact that 
depositaries must be located in the same Member State as the fund appointing it without an 
equivalent passport); Lamandini, supra note 42, at 6 (explaining how high concentrations in these 
particular countries can be partially attributed to beneficial tax rates and robust domestic retail 
markets). 
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C. UCITS III: PRODUCT DIRECTIVE 
The EC adopted the Product Directive in 200291 to give UCITS funds 
investment flexibility to adapt to changing markets while still protecting 
investors.92 Though the Product Directive permitted a UCITS fund to 
operate with a “higher degree of volatility and complexity” than was 
possible under UCITS I, the use of “advanced” investment strategies 
allowed these funds to hedge their risks to the benefit of investors.93 
Significantly, this directive amended the list of eligible assets94 by allowing 
UCITS funds to invest in money market instruments, bank deposits, funds 
of funds, standardized financial futures, options traded on regulated 
markets,95 and replications of stock index compositions.96 Under this 
directive, financial derivatives could be used for investment purposes and 
not just for efficient portfolio management, as under UCITS I;97 however, 
leverage was capped at 100% of the fund’s value.98 The Product Directive 
also increased the limit on investing a fund’s assets within the same body to 
20%99 and investments in non-UCITS to 30%.100 Importantly, the directive 
also required each manager to employ a “risk-management process.”101 
These changes were helpful in updating UCITS funds for the new 
century,102 but given the ever-changing nature of the finance industry and 
the passage of time,103 the Product Directive inevitably had to be updated. 
That update came through the Eligible Assets Directive,104 which 
clarified the investment powers described in the Products Directive.105 
                                                                                                                           
 91. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17. 
 92. See Schubauer, supra note 52, at 330–31. 
 93. See Simon Dodds, Current Regulatory Issues: Selected Materials, 1580 PLI/CORP 109, 
198 (2007). 
 94. See Council Directive 85/611, supra note 2, art. 19(1). 
 95. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17; Schubauer, supra note 52, at 330–31. 
 96. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17, art. 22(a). 
 97. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 254. Additionally, there had to be a process in place for 
ensuring the “accurate and independent valuation of OTC derivatives.” Id. at 255. 
 98. See id. at 255; Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17, art. 21(3). 
 99. Council Directive 2001/108, supra note 17, art. 22(1). 
 100. Id. art. 24(2). 
 101. Id. art. 21. 
 102. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252. 
 103. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473–74 (hypothesizing that a “new approach” to future 
legislation may be worth considering as “an increasing number of funds already fall outside the 
scope” of the UCITS framework given the continuing development of financial products and 
investment vehicles). 
 104. Council Directive 2007/16, supra note 67. 
 105. This directive was the first of the UCITS Directives to be implemented under the 
Lamfalussy regime. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 462–64. The Lamfalussy regime seeks to 
“streamline and accelerate” European securities legislation by establishing a committee system 
involving the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the European Securities 
Committee (ESC) to assist in the refinement of legislation through multiple levels of review. See 
Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 252; see also Dejmek, supra note 15, at 462–63 (explaining that 
the Lamfalussy framework is a four-level structure of legislative review: (1) “basic legislative 
framework adopted by []legislators”; (2) “comitology committee” approval by representatives 
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Under the Eligible Assets Directive, closed-end funds were considered 
eligible assets under certain conditions.106 Asset-backed securities, Euro 
Commercial Paper, index-based derivatives, and credit derivatives were 
also added.107 The Product Directive, in conjunction with the Eligible 
Assets Directive, updated the UCITS regime to remain competitive, yet 
certain limitations on products inevitably prevented UCITS from changing 
with the times.108 
II. ONE SMALL STEP, INSTEAD OF A GIANT LEAP: UCITS IV 
A. THE ORIGINS OF UCITS IV 
Although UCITS III constituted a significant step forward for the 
operation and harmonization of UCITS funds within Europe, it fell short in 
a number of ways.109 UCITS III resulted in national markets “dominated” 
by local funds without full integration.110 In fact, only three countries—
Luxembourg, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—have been able to market 
their funds to at least two-thirds of all Member States, leaving most 
countries with limited product choice and a relatively closed national 
market.111 Pursuant to these shortcomings, UCITS IV grew out of a number 
of evaluations over the efficacy of UCITS III,112 after which the EC 
concluded that five areas needed to be addressed in order to improve 
UCITS III: (1) notification procedures to the Host Member State’s 
                                                                                                                           
from all Member States; (3) CESR supplying technical advice to the EC on securities-related 
measures; and (4) monitoring the implementation and enforcement by Member States). However, 
it is worth noting that the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) took over CESR’s 
responsibilities starting in 2011. Baptiste Aboulian, Funds Seeking Clues on Rule Approach by 
ESMA, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 28, 2011, at 9. Nonetheless, this note will continue to refer to 
CESR for the sake of consistency. 
 106. Council Directive 2007/16, supra note 67, art. 2(2); Kovas, supra note 19, at 13–14. 
 107. ALAIN LECLAIR ET AL., POURING OLD WINE INTO NEW SKINS?: UCITS AND ASSET 
MANAGEMENT IN THE EU AFTER MIFID 39 (2008) (citing Council Directive 2007/16, supra note 
67). 
 108. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473–74. 
 109. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 6. 
 110. Id. (quoting Friedrich Heinemann, The Benefits of Creating an Integrated EU Market for 
Investment Funds 2 (ZEW, Discussion Paper No. 02-27, 2002), available at 
http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/24779/1/dp0227.pdf). 
 111. See id. (quoting Heinemann, supra note 110, at 3–4). 
 112. The EC presented a White Paper, highlighting the need to boost efficiency and facilitate 
market-driven restructuring of the investment fund market through amendments to UCITS III. See 
White Paper on Enhancing the Single Market Framework for Investment Funds, COM (2006) 686 
final (Nov. 15, 2006); Grace et al., supra note 13, at 574. The White Paper found up to €762 
million in potential annual savings, largely through permitting the centralization of management. 
Grace et al., supra note 13, at 574. Unresolved questions pertaining to such issues as the “scope of 
the ‘management’” company passport, extent of supervision and tax issues, in coordination with 
the Internal Market and Services Directorate General of the Commission (DG MARKT), also 
provided the groundwork for shaping UCITS IV. Id. at 574–75. 
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supervisory authority; (2) fund mergers; (3) asset pooling; (4) management 
company passports; and (5) a simplified prospectus.113 
UCITS IV was proposed in July 2008114 and approved by the European 
Parliament and the European Council almost a year later.115 Member States 
are required to adopt UCITS IV at the national level by June 30, 2011,116 in 
coordination with further advice from the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR),117 which has begun providing Level 2 
technical advice118 on the key changes encompassed in UCITS IV.119 
Though the areas of concern were putatively addressed in the five new 
chapters comprising UCITS IV,120 it may be too early to determine their 
true impact. 
B. CHANGES FROM UCITS III TO UCITS IV 
1. Notification 
An important change within UCITS IV is the further simplification of 
the notification procedure that allows a UCITS fund to be marketed in a 
Host Member State.121 Under UCITS IV, a UCITS fund seeking to market 
its units in another Member State may see faster approval and greater 
regulatory harmonization across Member States.122 Unlike UCITS III, a 
fund under UCITS IV may simply send notification of its desire to market 
its fund in a Host Member State to its Home Member State regulator, who 
will then send notification to the Host Member State within ten days.123 
Given the wide variety of information requested by Host Member States in 
granting authorization under UCITS III,124 costly, time-consuming delays 
often extended the stated two-month maximum review period.125 UCITS IV 
                                                                                                                           
 113. See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, at L42–43. 
 114. Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473. 
 115. See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 116. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473. CESR provides technical advice to the EC on 
securities-related measures. Id. at 463. For a detailed description of the Lamfalussy framework, 
under which CESR operates, see id. at 462–64. 
 118. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  
 119. Letter from Eddy Wymeersch, Chair, Comm. of European Sec. Regulators (CESR), to 
Jörgen Holmquist, Chair, European Sec. Comm. (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.esma.europa.eu/ 
popup2.php?id=6152. 
 120. Dejmek, supra note 15, at 473. 
 121. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 8. 
 122. See id. at 9. 
 123. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93. A fund no longer has to send 
notification to the Host Member State itself. See id. 
 124. For example, a fund wishing to passport into Italy had to submit an “extended application 
form” and a fund wishing to passport into France had to submit a “French addendum” or “French 
marketing memorandum.” Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23. 
 125. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 257. Notification costs trim about 0.25 basis points off 
total fund costs with estimated annual costs for continuing notification at €25 million in addition 
to upfront costs of €25 million, not including lost opportunity costs due to delays. Impact 
484 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
should speed up that process, in that a UCITS fund may begin marketing 
immediately once the Home Member State forwards the paperwork to the 
Host Member State.126 A Host Member State regulator is no longer able to 
review and reject authorization prior to the fund’s actual marketing, but 
may only do so ex post.127 
In addition to the notification procedure, the package of documents to 
be submitted to regulators has also been simplified.128 Under UCITS IV, a 
fund need only submit: (1) a notification letter; (2) its charter; (3) its 
prospectus; (4) its latest annual and semi-annual report; and (5) its key 
investor information document (KII).129 Although much of this information 
was previously required under UCITS III, Host Member States were 
permitted to—and did—request additional information,130 which is 
prohibited under UCITS IV.131 Additionally, Host Member States were able 
to impose translation requirements for various documents under UCITS 
III,132 imposing additional costs on UCITS funds seeking authorization.133 
However, under UCITS IV, only the KII is required to be translated into a 
local language, whereas the other documents are now able to be translated 
“at the choice” of a UCITS fund into the language of the Host Member 
State or “a language customary in the sphere of international finance” like 
English.134 These changes may help reduce barriers to entry and compliance 
costs,135 while encouraging further harmonization. 
                                                                                                                           
Assessment of the Legislative Proposal Amending the UCITS Directive, at 66–67, SEC (2008) 
2263 [hereinafter UCITS Impact Assessment]. 
 126. See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93. However, Natixis Asset 
Management anticipates that “regulators will have ‘wheelbarrows’ full of documents” from large 
fund managers upon implementation of UCITS IV in July 2011, which may reduce the efficiency 
of the notification procedure for managers. Baptiste Aboulian, ‘Paperwork Surprise in Store for 
Regulators’, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 8, 2010, at 15. 
 127. See RBC DEXIA INVESTOR SERVICES, TOWARDS THE NEXT GENERATION: MOVING FROM 
UCITS III TO UCITS IV 17 (May 2009), available at http://www.rbcdexia.com/documents/en/ 
UCITS/From_UCITS_III_to_IV.pdf [hereinafter RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION]. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93. 
 130. See Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23. 
 131. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 93(6). 
 132. See Council Directive 2001/107, supra note 16, art. 47. 
 133. See Karen L. Anderberg, UCITS and the Cross-Border Registration Process, PLC CROSS-
BORDER HANDBOOK (Mar. 2009), www.practicallaw.com/2-384-8117. 
 134. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 94(1)(c).  
 135. Such ongoing compliance costs include: (1) “filing of periodic sales reports in various 
jurisdictions”; (2) complying with “[d]iffering requirements for annual [and extraordinary] general 
meetings”; (3) seeking pre-approval of advertising material; (4) complying with varying tax 
requirements; and (5) complying with “[v]arious translation and mailing requirements.” 
Anderberg & Brescia, supra note 23. 
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2. Key Investor Information Document  
Under UCITS III, the contents of the “simplified prospectus” were 
subject to uneven interpretation and application by Member States,136 
sometimes lengthening the level of detail required.137 These supplemental 
requirements imposed an estimated €1 million in annual expenses for 
translation and printing of investor disclosures for a UCITS fund.138 Though 
the situation improved in 2004 when the EC issued a “Recommendation”139 
outlining the specific contents of the simplified prospectus, the 
recommendation remained largely advisory.140 As a component of the 
revised notification process, the KII acts to simplify the disclosure of 
pertinent information used by investors.141 The KII is designed to allow 
average retail investors to understand the nature and risks of their 
investment in a given UCITS fund in their own language and in a non-
technical manner,142 and to allow investors to better compare their options 
in a simple, concise format.143 With the implementation of KII, investors 
may be able to more easily compare funds and managers may find it easier 
to offer a standardized set of disclosures, regardless of the Host Member 
States to which they apply. 
3. Fund Mergers 
Under UCITS III, market inefficiencies in the EU have kept UCITS 
funds to about one-fifth the size of similar funds in the U.S.144 Due to the 
presence of domestic-only merger regimes and the absence of a cross-
border regime, smaller funds have been unable to combine with affiliated 
funds in other Member States in order to more efficiently operate and to 
take advantage of economies of scale that would reduce the costs passed on 
to investors.145 Under UCITS IV, Member States must allow cross-border 
mergers, in addition to domestic mergers.146 However, the ability to conduct 
                                                                                                                           
 136. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 258. 
 137. Variation in national requirements allowed some regulators to take a “lax approach” and 
others to take a more “risk-averse stance” to UCITS funds seeking authorization, allowing some 
regulators to ask for far more detail, thereby defeating the purpose of a “simplified” prospectus. 
See LECLAIR ET AL., supra note 107, at 41. 
 138. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 119. 
 139. Commission Recommendation 2004/384, 2004 O.J. (L 144) (EC). 
 140. Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 258. 
 141. RBC DEXIA PRESENTATION, supra note 127, at 7. 
 142. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 78(5). The KII is only allowed to contain 
the following: (1) “identification of the UCITS”; (2) “a short description of its investment 
objectives and investment policy”; (3) past performance presentation or scenario; (4) “costs and 
associated charges”; and (5) the “risk/reward profile of the investment” with applicable warnings. 
Id. art. 78(3), (6). 
 143. Id. art. 78(5). 
 144. Schmidt, supra note 11, at 177. “At the end of 2006, 54% of EU funds managed less than 
€50 million in assets . . . .” UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 81. 
 145. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 259. 
 146. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 38. 
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cross-border mergers is not without restriction.147 Mergers must be 
authorized by the merging member’s Home Member State to be effectuated 
and a decision must be made by the regulator within twenty days after the 
supporting documentation is submitted.148 UCITS IV also provides for an 
extensive and exhaustive list of “common draft terms of merger” that must 
be included as a part of the aforementioned documentation.149 In fact, a 
“vast majority” of UCITS fund managers plan to consolidate 
geographically-disperse funds upon implementation of UCITS IV, with 
43% of surveyed managers indicating cost savings as the primary reason for 
seeking to merge and 24% indicating easier access to markets as their 
rationale.150 It has been estimated that allowing mergers could save the 
European asset management industry €5 billion a year.151 
4. Master-Feeder Structures 
UCITS IV has also introduced the ability to pool assets in the form of 
master-feeder structures.152 Under UCITS III, the 10% limit on investment 
in assets of another UCITS fund prevented the formation of feeder funds.153 
However, under UCITS IV a master-feeder structure can now be 
established to allow a feeder fund to invest over 85% of its assets in a 
master fund, while retaining up to 15% of its assets in liquid assets, 
derivatives for hedging purposes, and property essential for operation of the 
fund.154 A feeder fund must obtain authorization to operate as such by 
submitting documentation to its Home Member State regarding its 
relationship with a master fund, the identity of its depositary, a prospectus 
and KII, and its investment policy.155 Importantly, despite requiring an 
attestation from the feeder fund regarding the legal identity of the master 
fund, these two funds may be established in separate Member States on a 
                                                                                                                           
 147. See id. art. 39–40. 
 148. Id. art. 39. 
 149. Id. art. 40. Some of the common draft terms include: type of UCITS involved, “rationale” 
for merger, and “expected impact” of merger. Id. 
 150. Giovanni Legorano, Managers Set to Consolidate in Preparation for UCITS IV, GLOBAL 
PENSIONS (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.globalpensions.com/global-pensions/news/1559782 
/managers-set-consolidate-preparation-ucits-iv. 
 151. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 81. 
 152. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 58. A master-feeder structure pools 
investments from various feeder funds into a master fund in order to produce economies of scale 
and particular tax advantages. Effie Vasilopoulos & Katherine Abrat, The Global Dream: The Use 
of Master-Feeder Fund Structures by Asian-Based Hedge Fund Managers, EUREKAHEDGE (Nov. 
2005), http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/05_nov_sidley_austin_master_feeder_structures.asp. 
Local investors invest in a domestic feeder fund that subsequently invests substantially all its 
assets in a master fund located elsewhere, which provides beneficial tax effects generally 
unavailable otherwise to the local investor. Id. 
 153. Helm & Babikian, supra note 77, at 861. 
 154. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 58. 
 155. Id. art. 59. The feeder fund is entitled to receive a decision regarding approval within 
fifteen days. Id. art. 59(2). 
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cross-border basis.156 Efficiency gains could be realized when the master-
feeder structure157 is used in conjunction with the merger provisions. 
5. Management Company Passport (MCP) 
Although the revised Management Company Passport was almost not 
included in UCITS IV158 due to concerns that allowing the passporting of 
management and administrative services could “rob the authority 
responsible for the fund of the means to monitor and to ensure 
compliance,”159 it was nevertheless included as an important, albeit 
controversial, part of UCITS IV.160 This “real”161 MCP was designed to 
enable greater efficiency and specialization, allowing fund managers to 
benefit from economies of scale and cost savings.162 The prior management 
passport under UCITS III created inefficiencies as UCITS funds established 
in contractual or unit trust form were not able to actually appoint a 
management company to oversee a fund in another Member State.163 As a 
result, only 10% of management companies actually passported their 
services.164 However, this failure has been addressed in UCITS IV. 
Under UCITS IV, the management company is only subject to 
prudential supervision by its Home Member State,165 despite having 
branches or providing services within other Member States.166 A 
management company must submit documentation to its Home Member 
State regulator in order to establish a branch in a Host Member State and 
the Home Member State regulator will forward the paperwork to the Host 
Member State regulator within two months, unless it has reason to doubt the 
                                                                                                                           
 156. See id. art. 59. 
 157. The master-feeder fund structure could save Europe’s fund industry between €2 billion and 
€3 billion a year. Steve Johnson, UCITS IV Offers Huge Savings, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 
2010, at 2. 
 158. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 10. 
 159. Grace et al., supra note 13, at 576. 
 160. See David Adams, UCITS IV-The Next Stage, INT’L CUSTODY & FUND ADMIN. (Sept. 24, 
2009), http://icfamagazine.com/public/showPage.html?page=icfa_display_feature&tempPageId= 
869229. 
 161. LECLAIR ET AL., supra note 107, at 3. 
 162. See Grace et al., supra note 13, at 576. 
 163. See Rouch & Smith, supra note 16, at 256. However, UCITS funds organized in corporate 
form were able to appoint a management company. See id. 
 164. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 110. 
 165. Home Member States are responsible for ensuring that each management company has 
sound “administrative and accounting procedures,” internal safeguards and controls for 
transactions, and procedures that minimize potential conflicts of interest between the company and 
its clients. Council Directive 2009/65, supra note 22, art. 12(1). Management companies must also 
have a minimum of €125,000 in capital, be managed by persons of “sufficiently good repute and  
. . . experience” and have their head office and registered office in the same Member State to 
become authorized. Id. art. 7(1). 
 166. See id. art. 10(2). 
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adequacy of the company’s administrative structure or financial situation.167 
Allowing management companies to consolidate could decrease a fund’s 
expenses, as establishing and maintaining separate management companies 
in Host Member States may cost a given fund up to €1 million a year.168 
III. THE TRUE COST OF COMPLIANCE: UCITS IV AND HEDGE 
FUNDS 
It would be a mistake to call the improvements from UCITS III to 
UCITS IV immaterial or nugatory. However, UCITS IV may still impose 
significant costs on hedge funds seeking a UCITS wrapper.169 While it is 
too early to tell how effective UCITS IV will be in actually achieving the 
original goals of the UCITS Directives,170 certain costs and benefits may 
already be apparent. However, the full extent of these costs and benefits 
may not be readily apparent to funds seeking compliance under the UCITS 
Directives, especially given the specter of hedge fund registration in the 
U.S. and the AIFM Directive in the EU seemingly pushing funds to seek 
UCITS compliance.171 As such, the rush of hedge funds seeking compliance 
under UCITS IV may be premature, absent certain necessary amendments. 
A. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FORMING A UCITS IV-
COMPLIANT FUND 
The UCITS structure offers several benefits to hedge fund managers 
under UCITS IV. Importantly, investors have turned their attention to issues 
of liquidity, transparency, and operational control amid recent market 
turmoil172 and UCITS IV presents a vehicle where these concerns can be 
met through a strongly regulated investment vehicle.173 Though a UCITS 
fund is more heavily regulated than the typical hedge fund, a unique benefit 
of the UCITS structure is its ability to utilize sophisticated financial 
instruments and strategies.174 Additionally, UCITS IV allows hedge fund 
managers to gain access to a larger investor base through the use of the 
                                                                                                                           
 167. See id. art. 17. The Host Member State has an additional two months to consider the 
request, allowing the management company to establish a branch after that two month period if no 
objection is made. Id. art. 17(6), (7). 
 168. UCITS Impact Assessment, supra note 125, at 110. 
 169. Goh, supra note 29. 
 170. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 171. See Thiha Tun & Samantha Shankar, Hedge Fund Focus: What Are the Key Issues?, 
COMPLINET (July 29, 2009), http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/89928414-F367-4E8A-
AB03-000896A55D96/11894/Hedgefundfocus.pdf. 
 172. Christopher D. Christian & Stephanie A. Barkus, UCITS: An Opportunity for Hedge Fund 
Managers, THE HEDGE FUND LAW REP., July 8, 2009, http://www.hflawreport.com/print/ 
article/433. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Hawks, supra note 5, at 190. 
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passport, reaching both retail and institutional investors,175 and doing so in a 
more efficient manner given recent changes.176 Taking advantage of a 
UCITS structure also presents an opportunity to take part in an industry that 
is poised to expand to €8 trillion by 2012.177 Additionally, the UCITS 
“badge” acts as an indication of “regulatory scrutiny and credibility that 
engenders investor confidence.”178 
However, the UCITS Directives impose significant limitations on 
hedge funds as currently formulated; it is not for the “faint-hearted”179 nor a 
“silver bullet.”180 Upfront costs for hedge funds seeking UCITS compliance 
include authorization paperwork, establishing infrastructure in Europe, and 
complying with capital requirements that do not exist in the U.S.181 For 
example, compliance with advertising and marketing rules, even after 
UCITS IV, may continue to impose high fixed costs upon funds passporting 
into other Member States.182 However, independent providers and 
investment banks may help alleviate certain startup costs for managers by 
offering platforms that reduce the cost and time associated with launching a 
fund.183 Nevertheless, ongoing costs include forming efficient compliance 
and risk management departments, whose costs will only be able to be 
                                                                                                                           
 175. See Christian & Barkus, supra note 172. But see Cecilia Valente, Europe Fund Firms to 
Shun Low-Cost Centres-Study, REUTERS, Oct. 25, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssInvestmentServices/idUSB42497820091026 (explaining how 
the mere availability of alternate markets does not mean that each country will be a desirable 
location to market a UCITS fund). 
 176. Though a survey by Ernst & Young reveals that fund managers are looking to UCITS IV 
more for business model alignment than as a way to bring operational cost reductions. Press Re-
lease, Ernst & Young, Investment Funds Move UCITS IV Focus to Business Model Alignment 
and Operational Efficiency (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.ey.com/RU/en/Newsroom/News-
releases/Press-Release---2010-01-12. According to BlackRock’s country head for Italy, Andrea 
Viganò, investors may not realize the full benefits of UCITS IV for a number of years. Andrew 
Fanko, UCITS IV Benefits Years Away: BlackRock, IGNITES EUROPE (Aug. 13, 2010), 
http://www.igniteseurope.com/c/116325/11148/ucits_benefits_years_away_blackrock. 
 177. Christian & Barkus, supra note 172. 
 178. Paul Allen, Hedge Funds Covet UCITS Badge, WEALTH-BULLETIN (June 15, 2009), 
http://www.wealth-bulletin.com/home/content/1054445328. Simon Firth, a partner at Kaye 
Scholer LLP, has stated that “a UCITS wrapper dispels in one fell swoop questions about 
transparency and lack of regulation that have plagued the offshore model.” Id. 
 179. Fischer, supra note 41. 
 180. BlackRock’s Clarvit Blasts UCITS Structure, FINALTERNATIVES (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11649. 
 181. Fischer, supra note 41. 
 182. See Lamandini, supra note 42, at 15. 
 183. Heather Dale, Hedge Funds Lean on Platforms for UCITS Entry, IGNITES EUROPE (Feb. 
22, 2010), http://www.igniteseurope.com/articles/20100222/hedge_funds_lean_platforms_ucits 
_entry. Though arranging for platforms risks certain tradeoffs like “exclusivity arrangements,” 
loss of control, and associated risk through others operating on the same platform. STRATEGIC 
INSIGHT, ALTERNATIVE AND HEDGE FUND UCITS IN THE NEXT DECADE 15 (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://www.alfi.lu/publications-statements/publications/alternative-and-hedge-fund-ucits-next-
decade [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE AND HEDGE FUND UCITS IN THE NEXT DECADE]. 
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absorbed by larger funds.184 Additionally, on the products side, fund 
managers are not permitted to utilize certain familiar strategies or 
investments within the UCITS Directives and may subsequently be unable 
to effectively operate the fund by shoehorning into a UCITS wrapper.185 
Additionally, the fourteen-day maximum redemption period—made 
available at the fund’s net asset value—limits a fund from taking positions 
in more illiquid assets, which may often be necessary to effectuate a 
particular strategy.186 As such, some strategies are more likely to be 
repackaged as UCITS than others.187 Overall, these regulatory constraints 
are passed on to investors in the form of higher fees188 and may result in a 
drop in performance.189 However, it is still too early to tell whether UCITS 
funds employing hedge fund strategies currently outperform traditional 
hedge funds, especially considering the variety of strategies in existence.190 
Regardless, these regulatory constraints have the potential to exert severe 
pressure on smaller hedge funds seeking to stay afloat through a UCITS 
                                                                                                                           
 184. See Fischer, supra note 41. For example, under UCITS IV, funds must demonstrate they 
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platform.191 Thus, while UCITS IV presents a salient opportunity for hedge 
funds, up-front and ongoing costs may be too high to justify such a 
conversion at the moment without certain amendments that would alleviate 
these costs. 
B. EXTERNAL FORCES CAUSING A FALSE START 
1. Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act in the 
U.S. 
While the cost-benefit analysis will be different for each fund in 
determining whether to establish a UCITS IV-compliant fund, certain 
external forces have the potential to skew certain managers’ perceptions of 
the appropriateness of establishing that fund. One such external force is 
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, also known as the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act 
of 2010 (the Registration Act).192 While nearly 55% of U.S. based hedge 
funds had registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
by the beginning of 2009,193 the Registration Act requires an investment 
adviser of hedge funds to register with the SEC under the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act) if it has more than $150 million in 
assets under management.194 In addition to complying with the Advisers 
Act, the Registration Act requires registered advisers to disclose a variety of 
information to the SEC,195 maintain books and records,196 and be subject to 
systemic risk supervision197 and possible examinations.198 Granted, 
impending registration adds a layer of regulation previously unknown to 
unregistered investment advisers of hedge funds, but the disclosure-centric 
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requirements within the Registration Act will not necessarily alter a 
particular fund’s overall operation and strategy—it will only require that 
certain information is reported.199 
Accordingly, investment advisers seeking to avoid registration in the 
U.S. may not find protection under a UCITS wrapper. As previously 
mentioned, UCITS funds are highly liquid, invest in a defined set of assets, 
avoid significant amounts of leverage, and do not engage in short selling.200 
Alternatively, a hedge fund that does not have formal diversification rules 
or limits on its range of investments is able to restrict redemption periods 
and may engage in strategies employing significant amounts of leverage 
and short selling.201 The Registration Act promises to monitor these 
activities more closely, but it does not restrict these activities as in the 
UCITS Directives.202 Thus, despite the threat of registration in the U.S., a 
UCITS-compliant fund may not make sense as an alternative for managers 
seeking a less burdensome regulatory regime under UCITS IV. 
2. Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive in the EU 
More critical to the decision of hedge funds seeking a UCITS wrapper 
is the potential scope and effect of the AIFM Directive,203 which was passed 
in late 2010.204 While many hedge fund managers may have rightly been 
anxious about the potential effects of the initial AIFM Directive,205 the final 
version has potentially allayed fears206 and rendered the decision to launch a 
UCITS-compliant fund less compelling as a means of regulatory avoidance. 
The AIFM Directive, as first proposed on April 29, 2009,207 sought to 
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regulate any alternative investment fund that was not a UCITS fund208 with 
more than €100 million in assets under management.209 Significantly, under 
the initial draft, funds based outside the EU could not market their funds in 
Europe for at least three years after implementation of the AIFM Directive, 
unless they were able to obtain authorization from a particular Member 
State and were based in a country with equivalent standards of prudential 
and ongoing regulation.210 This could have closed off U.S. based hedge 
funds from European investors due to non-equivalent standards. 
Additionally, the initial draft of the AIFM Directive imposed wide-ranging 
restrictions on the operation of funds.211 With these restrictions, it is easy to 
see why many hedge fund managers have sought cover under a UCITS 
wrapper. 
However, the initial draft of the AIFM Directive met fierce opposition 
from the alternative investment industry and was heavily criticized in a 
report commissioned by the European Parliament, calling the directive 
“vague, sweeping and inadequate,” “poorly-constructed, ill-focused and 
premature,” and “protectionist.”212 This criticism was so cutting as to force 
certain compromises in subsequent redrafts.213 However, while the sharpest 
edges of the initial draft have been sanded down,214 and additional 
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provisions have been added,215 certain aspects of the initial proposal still 
remain.216 Even though many hedge funds were rightly concerned about the 
deleterious effects of the AIFM Directive as initially drafted and factored 
this into their decision to pursue a UCITS wrapper, recent amendments 
have rendered those decisions to be somewhat short-sighted217 relative to 
the true costs of compliance under UCITS IV as it stands.218 
IV. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES: REALIZING THE GOALS OF 
UCITS 
While the current influx of hedge funds converting to UCITS funds 
may be somewhat premature considering the relative costs and the concerns 
over regulation, certain amendments to UCITS IV could rationalize this 
decision for many managers. Such amendments include further 
simplification and clarification of the notification procedures, greater 
product flexibility, depositary passporting, tax harmonization, and less 
restrictive distribution channels.219 With these amendments, many hedge 
fund managers and UCITS fund managers will better be able to justify the 
decision to become UCITS-compliant on a cross-border basis, due to a 
more fully integrated investment fund market. While all Member States are 
required to implement UCITS IV on a national basis by June 30, 2011,220 
certain changes to UCITS IV should still be made; the industry “can’t 
afford to wait for UCITS V”221 which will likely be a priority for the EC 
starting in 2011 and will focus on investor protection, rather than efficiency 
of the European fund market, and could take up to five years.222 
A. STREAMLINE NOTIFICATION AND IMPROVE THE PASSPORT 
Although UCITS IV has improved investor disclosure requirements and 
streamlined the notification process to potentially allow for greater 
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integration of the investment fund market in Europe, these improvements 
may fall short when translated from paper to practice. While the KII has the 
opportunity to simplify the cross-border marketing of a UCITS fund to 
investors in various Member States, the efficacy of this document heavily 
relies on all Member States agreeing on common definitions and risk 
classifications to make the comparison of funds relevant and meaningful.223 
If the definitions and risk classifications are overly broad, the KII will likely 
be no better than UCITS III’s “simplified prospectus” as individual 
Member States will have leeway to interpret the provisions and apply them 
as they see fit. Thus, the definitions and classifications should be drafted 
narrowly so as to avoid a multiplicity of interpretations.224 
UCITS IV has arguably simplified the notification process by providing 
for immediate marketing within a Host Member State and only ex post 
review. However, providing notification of a fund’s desire to operate in a 
Host Member State should be as simple as sending that notification directly 
to that state if the fund has already been authorized to operate in its Home 
Member State.225 Additionally, the ability of a UCITS fund to immediately 
operate in a Host Member State directly collides with the ability of that 
state to impose local marketing rules on foreign UCITS funds, as 
mandatory compliance with local marketing laws may make immediate 
operation less of a reality.226 As partial evidence of this skepticism, in a 
survey of asset managers, 10% cite the main drawback of UCITS IV as the 
concern that the MCP, the KII, and the notification process will not be as 
effective as advertised.227 Furthermore, many fund managers who have not 
acquired or inherited a “‘web of duplicate management companies and 
similar fund ranges’” will not likely even take advantage of an MCP228 in 
place of focusing on maintaining a local point of contact and local expertise 
for clients.229 As a result, an additional 10% of respondents cite the main 
drawback of UCITS IV as an increase in compliance costs and red tape, 
especially for managers who wish to remain domestic-based, yet need to 
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implement a risk management process.230 Without resolving the conflict 
between local marketing rules and the ex post review procedure, addressing 
disclosure clarification issues, and accounting for purely locally based 
funds, UCITS IV may not reach its full potential. 
B. UPDATING THE PRODUCTS DIRECTIVE 
With the focus of UCITS IV primarily on the consolidation and 
simplification of UCITS funds throughout Europe, this Directive currently 
fails to address the need for further refinements concerning product 
regulation. As financial products and investment vehicles continue to 
evolve, a number of funds run the risk of falling outside the scope of the 
UCITS Directives.231 The truth is that for a number of hedge funds, UCITS 
compliance will be a sizable step backward in sophistication.232 For 
example, short sales continue to be prohibited,233 despite being considered a 
legitimate investment strategy.234 There may also be a case for allowing 
investments in commodities and “microfinance,” which are presently 
excluded, despite their widespread use.235 Additionally, the explosive 
growth in the variety of UCITS funds offered has incited calls for clearer 
labeling of UCITS products.236 Currently, all UCITS funds are considered 
non-complex investments under the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID), which allows managers to market a fund without 
assessing the knowledge or experience of an investor in this “execution-
only” service.237 However, the EC is holding a public consultation on 
whether to bifurcate UCITS funds into complex and non-complex 
investments, relegating managers overseeing complex investments to 
sophisticated investors with “knowledge and experience” only or 
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eliminating the “execution only” regime entirely.238 CESR did not support 
changing the UCITS categorization—though it abstained from taking any 
position in its MiFID advice to the EC—and neither did many within the 
industry.239 While protecting retail investors from mistakenly investing in a 
UCITS fund utilizing hedge fund strategies makes sense in the abstract, the 
proposed KII may already provide an effective tool for disclosing the 
relative risk levels of a particular fund. Imposing an appropriateness test on 
a subcategory of UCITS funds may only lead investors to confuse 
complexity and risk.240 In addition to more flexible investment strategies, a 
clearer description of certain risk factors will make it easier for managers to 
improve disclosures to investors and help investors be more aware of the 
risks inherent in each investment regardless of the Member State. 
C. DEPOSITARY PASSPORTING 
Depositaries work alongside UCITS funds and their management 
companies to ensure the safekeeping of assets.241 The UCITS Directives 
have largely been silent on the role of depositaries; however, a depositary is 
required to have its registered office or branch in the same Member State as 
its fund and does not have a passporting feature associated with it,242 thus 
fragmenting the funds associated with these depositaries. A passport for 
depositaries would go a long way in decreasing costs, facilitating fund 
mergers, and ensuring harmonization across borders.243 However, a large 
majority of depositaries and custodians also find their roles to be 
“inappropriately defined.”244 At the beginning of 2009, the EC requested 
advice from CESR on potential improvements to depositaries in cross-
border management situations and CESR delivered its advice later that 
year.245 CESR proposed revising the definition of “safekeeping” by 
focusing on the “overall control of assets and segregation,” including the 
possibility of delegating custody to sub-custodians, while clarifying the 
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depositary’s liability and strengthening due diligence requirements with 
regard to the “selection, appointment, and periodic review of the sub-
custodian.”246 Pursuant to CESR’s advice, the EC has begun consultation on 
eventually incorporating depositary liability247 and passporting248 into 
UCITS V.249 However, as important as the depositary function is, a survey 
of asset managers shows that only 3% consider the lack of a depositary 
passport the main drawback of UCITS IV.250 Regardless, improvements in 
the depositary function will better allow managers to establish funds on a 
cross-border basis. 
D. TAX HARMONIZATION 
While allowing fund mergers to occur on a cross-border basis is an 
important step in creating a unified European investment fund market, tax 
issues must first be clarified and resolved before funds can realistically 
consider cross-border mergers.251 Currently, “[s]ignificant discriminatory 
tax barriers” exist relating to the sale of foreign UCITS funds in each 
Member State’s market.252 Importantly, CESR has warned the EC of the 
potential tax obstacles to fund mergers within UCITS IV.253 In fact, the tax 
situation is so vital to a fully harmonized investment fund market that 
UCITS IV may be a “dead directive” in Italy, unless its tax regime is 
revised.254 On the other hand, more tax efficient destinations, such as 
Luxembourg and Ireland, have disproportionately high concentrations of 
UCITS funds domiciled there, leading to further balkanization.255 One 
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suggestion has been to treat cross-border fund mergers under UCITS IV as 
non-taxable events.256 Significantly, a survey of asset managers suggests 
that the absence of a tax framework is the biggest drawback of UCITS IV, 
with 45% of respondents indicating concern over management company 
taxation, fund taxation, and investor taxation.257 Additionally, allowance for 
cross-border mergers under UCITS IV may actually cause Home Member 
States to further complicate their domestic merger regulations in response, 
being unable to independently regulate on a cross-border basis, which will 
likely have an effect on the effectiveness of integration.258 For example, 
certain Member States currently tax fund mergers at the investor level, 
which leads to situations where investors pay taxes on unrealized gains.259 
Additionally, under the laws of certain Member States, managing a fund on 
a cross-border basis could lead to a fund being a tax resident in the 
management company’s Home Member State, instead of uniformly being 
taxable where the fund is established.260 Further, certain Member States 
levy withholding taxes on cross-border dividend distributions to foreign 
feeders or impose a tax on redemptions in the country where their master 
fund is located, rather than having flows and transactions between master 
and feeder funds be tax neutral.261 Without a harmonized tax regime across 
the EU, much of UCITS IV will not be able to be effectively implemented 
or utilized by the investment fund industry and full integration will not be 
realized. 
E. EXPANSION OF DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS 
An additional obstacle to a fully integrated investment fund market is 
existing distribution channels where banks and other distributors often steer 
customers toward “in-house” funds rather than third party funds.262 The lack 
of investor choice that results from this type of favoritism and prevents 
foreign funds from reaching local investors must be addressed.263 Solving 
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the conflict of interest problem could be a great boon to investors as 60% of 
the cost of fund management is tied to the “distribution process and 
network.”264 Cutting distribution costs would allow more funds to access 
foreign markets and retail investors and it would increase the integration of 
the investment fund market. However, it has been estimated by members of 
the industry that cross-border fund distribution is likely to continue to be 
“difficult and inefficient for at least another five years,” despite the EC’s 
recent attempts at correcting the problem.265 Despite the large number of 
launches of UCITS funds employing hedge fund strategies, there is scant 
evidence that these vehicles are being fully funded due to skepticism by 
distributors as to the funds’ abilities to comply with UCITS III and their 
general lack of experience with a retail client base.266 Without addressing 
the collusive manner in which funds are distributed, full integration simply 
will not be possible.267 
CONCLUSION 
While the ink on UCITS IV is hardly dry, certain improvements need to 
be made in order to fully realize a truly integrated and efficient investment 
fund market in the EU. Addressing tax harmonization, fixing the current 
distribution scheme, adding depositary passporting, and improving both the 
notification and product restrictions would go a long way in making full 
and efficient integration a reality. However, this may be easier said than 
done. Part of the success of the UCITS Directives has been its “slow, 
carefully planned development.”268 Thus, while each of this note’s 
proposals aim to improve upon UCITS IV, funds may continue to push 
forward and take the risk that UCITS IV will look as good in practice as it 
does on paper. Granted, funds already employing significant amounts of 
leverage, engaging in short selling, and investing in illiquid securities may 
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find compliance prohibitively burdensome, but the benefits are potentially 
tangible—namely passportability and access to retail investors. Though the 
AIFM Directive in the EU and the Registration Act in the U.S. promise 
more bark than bite for investment funds, heightened regulation appears to 
be here to stay—at least in the near term—forcing managers to consider all 
available options. Accordingly, while the cost of UCITS IV may prevent 
some funds from seeking a UCITS wrapper, certain amendments could 
make compliance possible for many more. 
 
Kevin R. Johannsen 
                                                                                                                           
   B.A., Tufts University, 2006; J.D. candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011. I would like 
to thank my family for their unwavering love and support, as well as Shawn R. Singh for his 
mentorship and assistance in selecting this topic. I would like to extend particular appreciation to 
Mr. David Rouch for his generous contribution of time and assistance. I am also very grateful for 
the work of Robert Marko, Steven Bentsianov, and the entire journal staff for their hard work and 
careful editing. Finally, I would like to thank my fiancée, Lesley, for her support and whose own 
passion and enthusiasm served as a source of inspiration without which I could not have produced 
this note. 
